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MONITORING: ENSURING COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES’ EFFICIENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Benjamin Edwards, MPA Candidate, 2016.
Summary

Faculty Advisor: Professor David Campbell.

Methodology

This study is a review of Exit Interviews (EIs) of World For World Organization (WFWO)
appointed Country Representatives (CRs) who have served their various terms of office from
2008-2015 and WFWO executive management’s internal Performance Score assigned to
each CR during the same period. The review was done with the view to uncovering potential
operational loophole and monitoring deficiency that may have contributed to the CRs
inefficiency, mismanagement, and fraudulent activities that have triggered concerns among
executive management, sponsors, and other stakeholders. Following, it applies qualitative
comparative analysis to measure the impact the deficiency and loophole have on the CRs’
efficiency (i.e., their Performance Score).

Introduction
World for World Organization (WFWO) is a nonprofit organization based in Italy with
Consultative Status with ECOSOC (UN). It was founded in 2001 as an advocacy and
resource mobilization group to increase awareness on global development issues as well
as contribute to the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In an effort to contribute
to the MDGs, WFWO set up Ambassador for Development Networks (ADNs), overseen
by Country Representatives (CRs) to work with identified local partners to initiate
economic development projects. Areas of work include human security, economic
sustainability, food security, education, health, and children and women empowerment.
Image: Ghana ADN working in partnership with a local nonprofit organization on economic development project (2011)

Mischens

Research Design
I used three sources of information to learn about the impact monitoring has on the
CRs performance: 1) a review of Exit Interviews; 2) a review of management internal
Performance Scores; 3) correlation between the Exit Interview results and
Performance Score to help argue about causality
Review of Exit Interviews (EIs)
26 EIs from CRs who have served their various terms of office from 2008-2015,
covering eight countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Indonesia, The Philippines,
Thailand, Singapore) in two continents (Africa and Asia) were used for this study.
The CRs were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, where one is the lowest and 5 is
the highest, how often they (1) sought inputs from management; (2) received timely
response from management; (3) met with management; and (4) communicated
project operations reviews and reports information with management. The purpose of
the review was to provide a framework for theoretically determining level or degree of
monitoring. Monitoring routinizes contact between parties (Langfred, 2014) through
“regular dialogue” (p. 63). Building on this theory, my method assumed sustained
contact and regular dialogue corresponded to monitoring. Based on the indicated
responses, I coded the scales 0-2 as low or infrequent contact between executive
management and the CRs (therefore, low or inadequate monitoring) and 4-5 as high
or frequent contact and regular dialogue between executive management and the
CRs (therefore, close monitoring).
Review of Performance Scores
Management has graded performance of the CRs from 2008-2015. The Performance
Score ranges from 30 percent-100 percent (where the range, 30 percent-70 percent
assigned as low, and 80 percent-100 percent assigned as high) using their internal
performance evaluation mechanism.
Correlation Between EIs Result and management Performance Scores
First, I applied qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to determine which logical
conclusions the EIs results and Performance Scores support. I followed to apply
correlation analysis to help me define potential relationship between EIs results and
Performance Scores, and to test the hypothesized relationship: if close monitoring
(4-5) of the CRs results in efficient management of the ADNs (Performance Score of
80 percent-100 percent).

Research Question: Will close monitoring of the CRs lead to ADNs
operational efficiency (i.e, performance scores from 80-100 percent)?
A person’s ethical reasoning and conduct is affected by organizational structures and
norms (Rhode and Packel, 2009). Structures that lack monitoring can lead to managers
behaving opportunistically (Fama, 1980). Under circumstances where bending the rules
provides payoff, they may feel substantial pressure to put their moral convictions on hold
(Rhode and Packel, 2009). Thus, monitoring (an observation of an agent’s effort and
outcome) is expected to prevent managers from making decisions that may have a
negative impact on an organization regardless of incentive alignment (Fama, 1980).
Image: Some members from headquarters visiting project site in (2013)
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Findings

General
Fourteen of the twenty-six participants (53.8 percent) who received close monitoring
(i.e., indicated 4-5) showed efficiency (i.e., Performing Score from 80 percent-100
percent). The remaining eight participants (46.2 percent) who received inadequate
monitoring (i.e., indicated 0-2) showed inefficiency (i.e., Performing Score from 30
percent-55 percent). A correlation between level of monitoring and performance
score shows a perfectly linear relationship with a correlation coefficients of +1.00.
The results are represented on the graph in figure 1.0 below.

Figure 1.0. Correlation between Performance Score and Monitoring

Performance Score and Level of Monitoring by Year
Management’s internal Performance Score report shed light on variations in
performance by year. There seems to be a majority higher Performance Score from
the year 2008-2011 than from 2012-2015. Likely, from 2013-2015, management is
handling more and over-stretched. This impacted level of monitoring, and
subsequently, the CRs’ Performance Score. Table 1.0 shows the management’s
internal Performance Score assigned to the CRs (vertical coded green=performance
score in percentage; horizontal coded ash=year; horizontal with no color=the number
of CRs falling in score range).
Table 1.0. WFWO’s Management Internal CRs Performance Scores.

PR
(%)
30-70
80-100

Data Analysis
• I examined relationship between level of monitoring (high is 4-5; low is 0-2) and
individual CR’s Performance Score (high is 80 percent-100 percent; low
30percent-70percent).
• I compiled all responses (EIs) to the same questions together and examined as a
set to control for potential impact individual CR’s skills and/ or level of commitment
might have on Performance Score, then, I examined relationship between level of
monitoring and the CRs Performance Scores again.
• I examined the CRs Performance Scores and level of monitoring by year. This is
because span of control, (i.e., the number of staff that report to a manager) can
influence level of monitoring. There were fewer CRs from 2010-2012 than 20132015.

Prof. Pamela

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

3
23

2
24

2
24

3
23

12
14

11
15

13
13

14
12

Conclusion and Recommendation
In this study, I focused on the effect monitoring has on Performance of the CRs,
hence, efficiency of the ADNs operations. I sought to measure how level of monitoring
of individual CRs influence their performance, and how span of control can influence
level of monitoring, and in turn, affect performance. I have provided enough evidence
that, first, close monitoring of the CRs significantly enhanced their performance and
resulted in efficient management of the ADNs. This is supported by high Performance
Scores. Second, span of control significantly influenced the CRs performance. There
were majority higher Performance Scores when there were fewer CRs, and significant
majority poor Performance Scores as the CRs increased in number.
Using the results of this study as a measuring stick, it is theoretically reasonable to
recommend that WFWO puts in place effective monitoring system to enhance the
ADNs operational efficiency. This is also applicable to nonprofit organizations with the
similar operational structure.
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